The Rumsfeld Doctrine

It seems to me that the US continues with the "Rumsfeld doctrine", i.e. you don't supply troops with what they need, you don't train them in skills you need, instead you ship them out "as is". Or, as Rumsfeld enshrined it as doctrine: "You go to war with the Army you have, not the Army you might want or wish to have." (I would love to have seen the result of WWII if FDR has followed Rumsfeld's "doctrine".)

Here's a bit out of an article in The New Republic by Ganesh Sitarama that talks about his experience at Camp Julian's Counterinsurgency Training Center in Afghanistan:

"How many of you have read David Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice?" Lt. Colonel Matt Galton, the deputy director of the center, asked in his Australian accent. Two hands slowly went up. It was not surprising. Though Galula’s book is a--possibly the--classic starting point for counterinsurgency, it was written over 40 years ago and isn’t required reading. More troubling, when Galton asked how many had read the Counterinsurgency Field Manual, only about five hands went up.

This was surprising, given how pervasive, even trendy, counterinsurgency has become in policy circles. In the nearly three years since the release of the Counterinsurgency Field Manual, its authors have gone on to fame, at least in the public policy world: Nagl appeared on "The Daily Show"; Kilcullen is a frequent television commentator; and Petraeus, the lead author of the manual, is now the head of U.S. Central Command--in charge of the military’s operations in the Middle East. But, despite the coaches’ rise to prominence, most of the players haven’t read the playbook.

"I didn’t even know counterinsurgency was a term," Lieutenant Aaron Lewis said of his tour of duty in Iraq in 2004 and 2005. "I felt something was wrong with what we were doing ... but I didn’t know what."

...

One key tenet of counterinsurgency is that you need to understand the local population. Spending time at Camp Julien made clear that we still have a long way to go on that front. When an Afghan interpreter asked the students during a presentation how many read the local papers, listened to local radio, or had someone translate or brief them on the local news each day, about a dozen (out of 130) raised their hands. In a debriefing session later that day, a group of young officers asked why their commanders didn’t require everyone to follow the local news. Another officer said he had met fellow officers who explained that they were too busy to sit down over tea with village elders in order to build strong relationships; they only had time for official meetings.

But the problem runs deeper than just keeping up with local news or having the requisite cups of tea with residents. Instructors at Julien worried about the fear of casualties--particularly the fear of IEDs--pushing troops and civilians to stay on their bases as much as possible. The Counterinsurgency Field Manual rejects this approach, noting, in perhaps its most difficult paradox, that "sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be.” In the long run, the security of the base is a mirage: It leaves the population constantly at risk and increases the danger to soldiers whenever they venture out. And it prevents soldiers from understanding the people they are trying to protect.

The article is good. It is well worth taking time to read it.

My thoughts? Giants have feet of clay. The head is so far removed from the feet, that the head never worries where the feet might be stuck. The US goes to war and can't be bothered to figure out if it has the right "enemy" or if its troops are provisioned and prepared. Instead it asks "sacrifice" of the "little people" so that the big shots in Washington can strut on the world stage. Pathetic.