Mexico: A 'Failed State'?

Here are some bits from a report by David A. Shirk for the Justice in Mexico Project. This report doesn't directly answer the question of whether Mexico is becoming a failed state, but it makes clear that, unless something is done, the trend would imply this conclusion. The author is an academic seeking to affect policy decisions, so he takes a much more moderate tone in his writing. Showing strong emotion -- especially fear and panic -- is not a way to motivate bureaucrats:

Based on available data and current research on drug-trafficking in Mexico, the recent escalation and varied geographic patterns of violence appear to be the result of several immediate factors:

• the fractionalization of organized crime groups;


• changing structures of political-bureaucratic corruption;


• recent government efforts to crack down on organized crime (through military deployments and the disruption of DTO [Drug Trafficking Organization] leadership structures).

In addition, experts speculate that there may be larger macro-level factors contributing to the violence, such as shrinking drug demand in the United States; falling drug prices; increased border interdiction; or growing domestic demand in Mexico. However, it is not clear to what extent any of these larger trends has a significant or direct impact on violence. What is clear is that there has been a dramatic shift in Mexico over the course of the last 30 years. During the early- and mid-1980s, many current top DTO operatives— virtually all of them with roots in Sinaloa—worked within the same loosely knit set of allied organizations that controlled different commissions, or plazas, for smuggling drugs into the United States. At that time, DTOs operated with a level of impunity not seen before (or since) thanks to the protection then afforded to them by corrupt officials at very high levels in the Mexican government.

Beginning in the late 1980s, however, the relative tranquility that existed among the first generation of major Mexican drug traffickers began to erode. Following the murder of DEA agent Enrique “Kiki” Camarena in 1985 and the arrest of Miguel Angel Félix Gallardo in 1989, the subsequent breakdown of the central mechanisms of protection and coordination was accompanied by greater coordination and violence among DTOs. Félix Gallardo’s protégé, Héctor Luis “El Guero” Palma Salazar, was among the first to come into conflict with other traffickers, including his former mentor. The murder of Palma’s two children and his wife (whose severed head was reportedly sent to Palma) was one of the first salvos in a new era of violence among Mexican DTOs, including the so-called Tijuana, Juárez, and Sinaloa cartels.

Here is the "politically correct" conclusion of the study:

Whether or not H.R. 2134 is approved, developments in Mexico in 2010 will no doubt play a significant role in the ongoing debate over the effectiveness of current U.S. drug policy. Given the extraordinary number of drug-related killings, 2009 was a year of unprecedented, high-profile violence in Mexico. Since recent blows against key DTOs may produce more turmoil over the ensuring months, the toll of drug-related violence remains high at the start of the new decade. Such violence must be taken in context, since drugrelated killings are heavily concentrated in a few key states and very few members of the general population are casualties of this violence. However, the number of drug-related killings has clearly increased to unacceptable levels and creates serious concerns for both Mexican policy makers and citizens. While the problem of drug-related violence should not be exaggerated, it must be addressed. Identifying the best pratices and strategies for both the short and long term must be a top priority for both Mexico and the United States.

This is far too temperate a conclusion. Especially when you note that the current elections in Mexico have ended in a crescendo of violence as reported by The Christian Science Monitor:

A leading gubernatorial candidate is gunned down by suspected organized criminals disguised as soldiers. A severed head is dumped near the house of a mayoral candidate. Voters wake up to four bodies found hanging from bridges. Candidates arrive to cast their ballots in bulletproof vests accompanied by security entourages.

Welcome to Mexico's election, in which drug violence has intimidated front-runners and decreased voter participation in Sunday's races to replace 12 of the nation’s 31 governors.

...

Voter turnout differed depending on the state, but came close to a standstill in areas where cartel violence spread to the elections.

In the border state of Tamaulipas, where suspected cartel hitmen assassinated gubernatorial candidate Rodolfo Torre Cantu on June 28, only 38.6 percent of voters cast their ballots. Torre Cantu’s brother ran in his place, arriving at polling stations with heavy security detail.

Reports of unidentified gunmen circling polling stations also kept voters away. Voter participation in the crime-plagued border city of Juarez was only 20 percent, the local La Jornada newspaper reported.